DCF/274

MANY COUNTRIES, DESPITE CONCERNS, COULD ACCEPT DRAFT TEST-BAN TREATY, DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE TOLD

GENEVA, 19 August (UN Information Service) -- There seemed to be a widespread realization that the draft comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT) currently before the Conference on Disarmament represented the very limits of what could be negotiated, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban said this morning.

As he presented the Committee's report to the Conference, Jaap Ramaker, (Netherlands) expressed regret that no consensus could be reached on a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty. Nevertheless, many delegations had concluded that despite remaining concerns, they could accept the draft treaty as it stood. He recommended that the Conference adopt the report, which contains the draft, and submit it to the General Assembly.

The Conference went on to adopt the Ad Hoc Committee's report, but further consultations will be necessary before it decides what further action to take on the document. India, meanwhile, reiterated its opposition to the draft treaty text and said it would not agree to it being forwarded to the Assembly in any form.

Also taking the floor was the representative of Pakistan, who blamed his country's "eastern neighbour" for preventing the recommendation of the adoption of a comprehensive test-ban treay after two-and-a-half years of negotiations.

Last December, the Assembly had requested the Conference to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty in time for it to be opened for signature at the outset of the fifty-first Assembly session, which opens on 16 September.

At the outset of this morning's meeting, Ludwik Dembinsky (Poland), who is taking over the rotating Presidency of the Conference from Jos� Urrutia (Peru), said he had hoped to gavel in the final consensus text of a comprehensive test-ban treaty during his tenure, but it did not seem now that

this hope would materialize. He welcomed the resolution of the question of expansion of the membership of the Conference with the admission of 23 new members in June, adding that he would continue consultations on 13 outstanding applications for membership and pursue efforts to determine how best to address the issue of nuclear disarmament within the Conference.

Statements

JAAP RAMAKER (Netherlands), introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban, said that despite the support expressed for his draft treaty text, and much to his regret, no consensus could be reached either on the text or on its transmittal to the Conference. Since his assumption of the Chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee last January, tremendous progress had been made towards the realization of a comrehensive test-ban treaty. There was widespread awareness that with the latest version of the draft, the Ad Hoc Committee had reached the very limits of what it could negotiate. Thus, a great many countries had concluded that, despite remaining concerns, they could accept the draft treaty as it stood now. He recommended that the Conference adopt the report and submit it to the General Assembly.

ARUNDHATI GHOSE (India) said the draft text presented by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on 14 August did not reflect the balance imperative in the mandate the Conference had given itself in January 1994 "to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty". The text, in fact, failed to conform to the intent of the mandate. The urgent challenge of capping the vertical proliferation and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons had not been met, and the progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons which should have been heralded by the comprehensive test-ban treaty remained as out of reach as ever.

During the negotiations, she went on, India had tried to remove some of the draft treaty's shortcomings, first by attempting to place it within the disarmament framework by defining it as the first step in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework. What India had been seeking was a commitment which could have acted as a catalyst for multilateral negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a reasonable period of time, not to prescribe a specific time-frame. Secondly, aware that technologies relating to sub-critical testing, advanced computer simulation and weapon-related applications of laser ignition would lead to fourth generation nuclear weapons, India had also sought a truly comprehensive treaty, not just a ban on nuclear explosions. Despite India's best efforts, those concerns had been ignored, and the country had been obliged to reiterate that it could not subscribe to the Chairman's text.

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After India had made its decision not to back a May version of the Chairman's text, the proposed treaty's entry-into-force provisions had been modified, apparently at the insistence of a small number of countries whose aim it was to impose obligations on India, she said. It was unprecedented in multilateral negotiations and international law that any sovereign country should be denied its right of voluntary consent on adherence to an international treaty. In the face of those concerns, India's opposition to the text continued; the country would not agree to it being forwarded to the General Assembly in any form by the Conference.

MUNIR AKRAM (Pakistan) said his delegation deeply regretted that after two-and-a-half years of painstaking negotiations, the Conference had been prevented by one country from recommending the adoption of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Pakistan had already declared its views on the shortcomings of the draft treaty -- its scope should have been more comprehensive; it should have included clearer commitments to nuclear disarmament and against the further development of nuclear weapons; it should have included more categorical assurances against the abuse of procedures for on-site inspections and the use of national technical means in verifying compliance with the treaty. None the less, Pakistan was prepared to endorse the draft, believing that the comprehensive test-ban treaty could be -- should be -- a first step in the process of nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The treaty would help constrain the development of new types of nuclear weapons and the qualitative development of existing nuclear weapons. It would contribute quite decisively to nuclear non-proliferation, especially in Pakistan's region.

He added that it had been said that the opposition to the comprehensive test-ban treaty had come from an unlikely source. From the outset, however, Pakistan had expressed its concern about the nuclear ambitions of its eastern neighbour. Hypocrisy had been the hallmark of the nuclear posture of that country when, for instance, Pakistan had proposed the creation of a nuclear- weapon-free zone in south Asia. And when Pakistan had suggested bilateral or regional full-scope safeguards, or bilateral or regional commitments against nuclear proliferation, its neighbour had replied that it could accept only global measures which committed the nuclear-weapon States also. The comprehensive test-ban treaty was such a measure. Yet, that too was rejected.

"Today, the mask of the 'Smiling Buddha' has been torn off, revealing the face of the `Goddess of War'", he went on. The leaders of Pakistan's neighbour had proclaimed that they would keep their nuclear options open; that they reserved the right to conduct nuclear tests; and that they would go ahead with their short and medium-range missile programmes. But any step of nuclear escalation by its neighbour would find a matching response from Pakistan, which would seek to preserve its national security. Pakistan would not accept discrimination or double standards. It would not accept unilateral

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obligations or commitments. Aware that the comprehensive test-ban treaty might rise like the phoenix from the ashes at the Assembly, Pakistan would also regret any procedure that circumvented the Conference, which was the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. The responsibility for the consequent erosion of the Conference's role and functions was clear.

SIROUS NASSERI (Iran) said negotiations on a draft treaty had at the end been overwhelmed by a self-imposed urgency. The talks had also developed an unhealthy trait: they had moved behind closed doors and become limited to an exclusive group of States. He would not oppose the adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, but urged caution and care in pursuing further efforts so that the progress achieved was not lost.

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