Kerry Campaign Fact Sheet: Fighting the Bioterrorist Threat 6/2/2004
From: Allison Dobson of John Kerry for President, 202-712-3000, Web: http://www.johnkerry.com TAMPA, Fla., June 2 -- The Kerry Campaign today released the following fact sheet on Fighting the Bioterrorist Threat: A terrorist attack with biological agents like anthrax, smallpox, or a bioengineered organism could kill or endanger millions of Americans. Yet there are significant gaps in our defenses. We do not have strong national leadership in planning or coordinating our efforts to prevent bioterrorism. Our hospitals are overwhelmed and our public health system cannot handle large, lethal epidemics of disease. We lack adequate supplies, drugs and vaccine. And we are not working closely with allies to address these threats internationally. John Kerry will bring focused leadership to fighting the bioterrorist threat: reforming our health care system, creating a new "Medical Arsenal of Democracy" to speed drug and vaccine development, working with the scientific community to both strengthen security at laboratories that handle dangerous pathogens and to prevent the misuse of advances in science and technologies; and cooperating with allies to reduce the grave threat of biological attack. I. The Bioterrorism Threat A Grave Risk. In the months after September 11th, letters containing anthrax killed 5 people and infected 13 more, terrifying large segments of the population, disrupting critical functions of government, and costing billions of dollars. One hundred kilograms of anthrax aerosolized over an American city could kill as many as 3 million people, comparable in effect to a one megaton nuclear weapon. Newly engineered toxins present further dangers. (New York Times, 1/2/02; JAMA, 1999; Office of Technology Assessment, 1993) Easier to Build and Hide BioWeapons. Compared to nuclear weapons, biological weapons are inexpensive and easy to produce. Some of the pathogens are commonly found in nature; others are legitimately used in laboratories, where they can be stolen or hidden. And information about producing bioweapons is increasingly available on the Internet. (AP, 7/19/02) New Threats. While the advances of modern biotechnology offer great hope, they also permit the creation of more dangerous threats. Last year, scientists from the State University of New York created an infectious polio virus from scratch using information available on the Internet and materials bought by mail order. As scientists learn to alter biological processes in pursuit of curing disease and improving agriculture, they will inevitably reveal techniques that could be used to build new and more dangerous bioweapons. The scientific community and the world of nations must learn to use this powerful new knowledge responsibly (Baltimore Sun, 11/1/2003; House Comm. on Homeland Security, Min. Rept., 5/04). II. The Gaps in America's Response -- Nobody is in Charge. Today, there is no individual and no agency in charge of allocating budgets or coordinating efforts to respond to biological threats. One recent study found that for just five diseases, seven cabinet agencies and 200 government offices are involved in the response, with no single entity in the lead. Even during the recent highly scripted TOPOFF2 bioterror response exercise, where the participants knew what was coming and when, there was serious confusion about agency roles. The bipartisan bioterrorism legislation signed by President Bush in 2002 required the Administration to establish a high-level group to coordinate response to these challenges. To date, the Bush Administration has still not complied with this law. (Trust for America's Health, 2004; Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, sec. 108; Senate Committee on Govt. Affairs, Min. Letter, 5/7/04) -- No National Strategy. Nearly three years after the anthrax attacks, we still do not have the strategic plan for America's biodefense required by the 2002 bioterrorism legislation. Although the Administration recently released a long-awaited review of federal biodefense programs, it is only a laundry list of existing programs that fails to meet the most basic requirement of the law- creating a real biodefense strategy. The document also does not clarify agency roles in the event of an attack, and does not answer basic questions like how to coordinate responses in a multi-state attack. There is no strategy for ensuring that our research program will produce the drugs we need when we need them, no plan to attract the best scientists to such research. In fact, experts have concluded that "we have no national biodefense policy at all." (Bioterrorism Act, sec. 101; Gilmore Commission, 2002; GAO, 2003; Los Angeles Times, 5/23/04) -- After Increases, Proposed Cuts in Biopreparedness Funding. While funding for biopreparedness has increased since 2001, President Bush is now proposing cuts in critical areas. For 2005, the Administration proposed cutting the state and local biopreparedness program by 11 percent, or $105 million. Under the Administration's internal budget framework for 2006, which a memo obtained by the Washington Post confirmed represented official budget policy, funding for "biodefense countermeasures" overall would decrease by $49 million. Just last week, the Administration proposed taking away $55 million in biopreparedness funding for states and using the money for specific cities - this would cost Florida $375,000 and many other states more than $1 million. The Trust for America's Health concluded that "by shifting money around rather than properly investing in strong bioterror defense across the board, we are leaving huge areas unprepared and vulnerable." The Administration's proposed cuts are particularly striking at a time when our public health system is "structurally weak in every area," according to the CDC. (CDC, 2001; TFAH, 2004; IOM, 2004; OMB, 2004; OMB Memo posted at www.OMBWatch.org, 5/04) -- Cuts in Help for Overwhelmed Hospitals. Hospitals are essential to treating victims of a bioattack and preventing the spread of pathogens, yet they have not received the focused support they need to fill this mission. Hospitals are overwhelmed by demands of routine care and hundreds of emergency departments have closed in the past 10 years, even as the number of emergency room visits increased by 23 percent between 1992 and 2002. Because of massive budget shortfalls, nearly two-thirds of states have cut funding for public health. President Bush recently proposed cutting Medicaid by $16 billion, adding to pressure on emergency rooms and clinics. (CDC, 2001; 2002; OMB, 2004; TFAH, 2004; IOM 2004) -- Inadequate Development of Drugs and Vaccines. We currently have only a handful of effective drugs or vaccines against the many potential biological threats we face. Furthermore, a determined terrorist may be able to develop new organisms that are resistant to the pharmaceuticals we have, or organisms that we have never seen. We are distressingly unarmed against these threats. The recent passage of Project Bioshield - a year and half after President Bush called for it in the State of the Union Address -- is a first step toward responding to this dire need, but it still only addresses vaccine and drug development relatively late in the process and only in a limited number of circumstances. (Washington Post, 5/24/04) -- Failure to Work with Allies to Fight Bioterrorism. Because deadly pathogens know no borders, the United States must work closely with the international community to address the possible spread of disease. But the Bush Administration has not committed to the cause of strengthening global disease surveillance. And they torpedoed international negotiations to strengthen the 1972 treaty that bans biological weapons, greatly undermining efforts to achieve international standards for biosecurity, biosafety, and research oversight. III. A Real Commitment to Biosecurity: John Kerry's Framework for Preventing a Bio-Terror Attack 1. Provide the Hands-On Leadership and Planning Missing Today. John Kerry recognizes the significance of the bioterrorism threat. He will establish the coordinated, national response that is lacking under this Administration. Among other things, this means putting one person in charge of overseeing all bioterrorism programs, budgets, and strategic priorities; convening the leaders of public and private sector response for a White House conference on tackling the bioterrorism challenge; and working with state and local leaders to establish the benchmarks for state and local preparedness required by law and still missing today. 2. Strengthen America's Hospitals and Health System. As President, John Kerry will restore the strength of America's public health system-both by lifting burdens from hospitals, and by adequately funding biopreparedness in particular. Kerry will work with hospitals to ensure they have emergency plans to address a surge in medical needs under mass causality and exposure conditions while working to make our health care system more cost- effective and robust. By making insurance more affordable and covering about 95 percent of all Americans, John Kerry will shorten lines in emergency rooms, relieve pressure on state budgets, and allow public health systems to focus on public health challenges like bioterrorism. At the same time, he will invest in strengthening our public health system to respond to bioterrorist threats. For example, he will support a strong public health workforce, with new student aid for young people who commit to service in public health and emergency preparedness training for those already serving, as well as regional collaborations across state and even national borders to ensure coordinated responses when attacks cross formal boundaries. 3. Use New Technologies For Disease Detection and Response. Because a fast response to bioterrorist attack is critical to reducing casualties and controlling the spread of disease, advances in technology can save lives. John Kerry will encourage research and innovation to strengthen our capabilities-with rigorous technology assessment before full-scale adoption, to avoid large-scale investments in faulty technology. Specifically, as part of his commitment to reduce costs in our health care system and improve public health, John Kerry will establish a national electronic medical records system with strong privacy protections. This system will enable public health officials to detect the emergence of disease-and help them develop the situational awareness needed to manage outbreaks, either from bioattack or natural epidemics. 4. Create a Medical Arsenal of Democracy. We must harness America's bioscience genius to improve preparedness for a bioterror attack. John Kerry will establish a new strategic initiative dedicated to speeding drug and vaccine development, particularly in the "valley of death" period between basic discovery and clinical trials. Bringing together leaders from the National Institutes for Health, research universities, and the private sector, this Strategic Drugs and Vaccine Initiative will have a mandate to identify the barriers to new drug and vaccine development and production, including regulatory requirements, liability issues, and intellectual property protections. Among other issues, the Initiative will consider reform of patent laws, such as those recently recommended by the Federal Trade Commission, as well as production of drugs or vaccines through direct contracts with private entities, as recommended by the Institute of Medicine. Kerry will put the recommendations of the Initiative on a fast track for approval by Congress. These measures will not only improve our bioterror preparedness - they will also help speed the development of other drugs and vaccines, including measures to combat diseases that devastate the developing world. 5. Galvanize International Cooperation to Combat Bioterrorism. As President, John Kerry will provide international leadership to combating biological weapons as well as naturally occurring diseases. As the initial steps in a broader program, Kerry will reconstitute international negotiations to strengthen the bioweapons ban, building on lessons from United Nations inspections, visits to bioweapons facilities in the former Soviet Union and new trial inspections at government, university, and industrial facilities. He will push for implementation of a sensible and enforceable international law criminalizing the development, acquisition, possession, and use of biological weapons. To prevent terrorist from acquiring dangerous pathogens, he will work with the international scientific community to construct and implement international standards for biosafety and biosecurity. He will also work to expand the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and make it a priority in our relations with Russia to secure any remaining biological agents and ensure that weapons programs scientists can be put to work creating antidotes and vaccines against biological threats. He will work closely with the World Health Organization and individual nations to strengthen global disease surveillance and response. Kerry vs. Bush on Preventing Bio-Terrorism Leadership Bush: No one in charge of bioterror preparedness, no plan as required by law. Kerry: National priority and strategic plan. Will appoint a senior leader with broad authority Public Health and Medical Care Bush: Some investments to date, but now proposing cuts in key state efforts, hospitals badly neglected. Kerry: Immediate health care reforms; support for hospitals; support for stronger bioterror preparedness in public health system. Technology Bush: Inattention until election year. Lack of strategy not linked to improved response. Kerry: Establish electronic medical records system and meaningful detection system. Vaccines and Drugs Bush: Only a handful of the countermeasures needed. Kerry: New initiative to create "Medical Arsenal of Democracy." International Cooperation Bush: Undermined efforts to strengthen Biological Weapons Convention. Kerry: Will strengthen BWC and expand threat reduction efforts. ------ Paid for by John Kerry for President, Inc. |