Union of Concerned Scientists Statement on the 50th Anniversary of Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' Speech

12/8/2003

From: Ed Lyman or Rich Hayes, 202-223-6133, both of the Union of Concerned Scientists

WASHINGTON, Dec. 8 -- The following is a statement by the Union of Concerned Scientists on the 50th anniversary of Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' speech:

"Today marks the 50th anniversary of the 'Atoms for Peace' speech delivered by President Eisenhower at the United Nations, in which he called on the United States and the Soviet Union 'to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international Atomic Energy Agency' that would then 'devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind.' The speech was in fact a shrewd piece of Cold War propaganda, although one that ultimately failed to achieve its primary purpose of shaming the Soviets into donating a large fraction of the fissile material that they had produced for nuclear weapons to a 'bank' under international control. However, the United States later sold the speech to the international community as a visionary tribute to the promise of civilian applications of nuclear energy.

"But the actual legacy of Atoms for Peace was far darker than the optimistic projections of its early cheerleaders. For example, in the decades following the speech the United States supplied research reactors and the highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to operate them to dozens of countries, including Argentina, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Romania and Turkey, and other nuclear weapon states followed suit. Because HEU can be used to make nuclear weapons of a relatively simple design, it is highly attractive to terrorists. The United States belatedly recognized this dangerous situation and eventually began to take steps to address it by developing alternative fuels made from low-enriched uranium (LEU), which cannot be used directly to make nuclear weapons. Today, however, HEU remains at dozens of poorly secured research reactors worldwide, where it is vulnerable to theft.

"Nuclear energy programs have stagnated over the last quarter- century in the United States and many other developed nations. However, nuclear power boosters in government, academia and think tanks have been energized by the Bush White House and the current Congressional leadership, who have shown a 1950's-type enthusiasm for huge government subsidies to jumpstart new nuclear power development in the face of little interest by private industry. Now, officials at the nuclear weapon laboratories, in a continuing search for new funding and relevance, are using the anniversary of the speech as a platform to promote a second 'Atoms for Peace' era that they hope will herald a major worldwide expansion of nuclear energy.

"Most nuclear power reactors worldwide use fuel made from low- enriched uranium. The spent fuel can either be directly disposed of (referred to as a 'once-through' nuclear fuel cycle) or 'reprocessed' to extract the plutonium in the spent fuel. This plutonium can be used to fuel reactors but-like HEU-can also be used to make nuclear weapons. In a 'closed' fuel cycle, the spent fuel is reprocessed to produce plutonium, which is then used to make fresh reactor fuel. Thus, the closed fuel cycle requires the production, transportation, and storage of weapon-usable materials. In recognition of the dangers associated with reprocessing, the United States declared a moratorium on reprocessing commercial spent nuclear fuel in the 1970s. As a result, the United States is not saddled with the security and cost burden of storing large stockpiles of civil plutonium, unlike countries that do reprocess spent fuel such as France, Japan and the United Kingdom.

"The most dangerous aspect of the new U.S. nuclear energy program is its renunciation of this quarter-century old nuclear nonproliferation policy, which was adopted in part to correct the excesses of the Atoms for Peace era. Today, with the assent of Congress (to the tune of $92 million in FY 2004), the Department of Energy is undertaking a huge international program to develop a new generation of plutonium-fueled fast-breeder reactors and reprocessing plants. Some scientists at the national laboratories are also hoping to develop small plutonium-fueled reactors for export to the developing world. Indonesia in particular has expressed interest in powering remote parts of its archipelago with such reactors.

"In October, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei proposed that all civilian facilities for producing enriched uranium and plutonium be placed under international control. Nations seeking access to those materials would presumably have to demonstrate a legitimate need for them.

"While ElBaradei's proposal has some merit, it doesn't go nearly far enough. Eisenhower's proposal of a fissile material 'bank' assumed that the material would be stored in 'special safe conditions' so as to be 'essentially immune to surprise seizure.' Any weapon-usable material produced in these international facilities should be required to meet the same standard during its transportation to approved users, as well as during storage and use at recipient sites. However, meeting this challenging and costly standard over the entire life-cycle of weapon-usable materials is far beyond the capacity of private industry, especially in view of the sophistication and resources of the terrorist organizations operating today.

"The reaction of U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham to ElBaradei's proposal was reportedly noncommittal. This should be no surprise-such a regime would constrain the Department of Energy's own plans to develop new "Generation IV" breeder reactor systems and make them available for international deployment by the year 2030. Some systems being designed would have their own reprocessing plants attached, so would not generally be permitted under ElBaradei's proposal.

"Both ElBaradei and Abraham argue that development of a new generation of nuclear energy systems that are proliferation- and terrorist-resistant can solve the security problems associated with the large-scale shipment and use of weapon-usable materials around the world. But it's a pipe dream to believe that a technological fix will be found to what is largely a political problem. This fact is reflected in the view of State Department officials who would oppose the export of any nuclear technology to countries like Iran, no matter how 'proliferation-resistant' its designers claim it to be.

"It's time to acknowledge that weapon-usable material in commerce cannot be made 'essentially immune to surprise seizure.' The only way to increase assurance that weapon-usable material will be kept out of terrorist hands is to ban its production and use altogether. The Bush administration should pull the plug on its grandiose reprocessing plans, and work instead to encourage its allies to follow suit. Although the 'once-through' nuclear fuel cycle that is now the norm in the United States is not invulnerable, it remains the most proliferation-resistant nuclear energy system that has been devised."