Transcript of Energy Secretary Abraham's Remarks Before Second Annual Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference in Moscow

9/19/2003

From: Jeanne Lopatto of the U.S. Department of Energy, 202-586-4940

WASHINGTON, Sept. 19 -- The following transcript of Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham's remarks before the Second Annual Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference in Moscow was released today:

September 19, 2003

Introduction

Thank you for having me here at this year's conference, which, I understand, marks the 10th anniversary of the Moscow Carnegie Center's creation.

Carnegie, along with the Center for Policy Studies, has done its usual exemplary job in bringing such an impressive group together; this is a real testament to the blossoming of public policy research and debate in Russia.

This event is an opportunity to take a hard look at important proliferation-related concerns and issues, and deliberate over sensitive policy alternatives that may shape the security environment for years to come.

Policy practitioners like myself will be looking closely at the outcomes and recommendations that stem from these discussions.

Russia's Essential Role

I am pleased to share the keynoting responsibilities tonight with Minister Rumyantsev.

For two years, I have worked closely with the Minister to implement bilateral nonproliferation programs. He shares my deep commitment to reducing proliferation threats, and I believe he is as proud as I am of the progress that we have made.

The United States and Russia are working together to address undersecured nuclear materials that could be vulnerable to theft or sabotage. We are taking steps to shut down reactors that are still producing plutonium that could be used to make nuclear weapons. We are helping displaced Russian nuclear scientists and engineers find gainful employment with commercial applications. And we remain committed to each reducing our surplus stores of plutonium by 34 tons, so that 68 tons will be reduced altogether.

Yet, I know some ask, "Why can't more be done?

Why can't Russia and the United States move faster?"

Well let me assure you that, like everyone in this room, we would like to do more, and do it faster, and we are finding ways to do so.

It is in this spirit that Minister Rumyantsev and I have taken steps to accelerate the progress of our programs.

When the Administration took office in 2001, the Department of Energy's budget for nuclear nonproliferation work was around $850 million. Two years later, the President's FY '04 request for DOE's overall nonproliferation programs is nearly $1.3 billion.

Last year, we launched the G-8 Global Partnership. The members of that partnership have committed to spend up to $20 billion on cooperative programs in Russia and the FSU over the next ten years - half of which will come from the United States.

Our programs are producing real, meaningful results.

-- We've met our 2003 goal of securing an additional 35 metric tons of Russia's weapons usable fissile material through comprehensive security upgrades. This is more than twice as much material as last year.

-- We've shortened the schedule of security upgrades throughout the former Soviet Union by two years.

-- We've improved security at over 70 percent of the original MPC&A sites in Russia that store this material.

-- We've expanded our work to include the Strategic Rocket Forces, and Russia's Navy.

-- In addition to continuing the 1993 HEU Purchase Agreement, we have enlarged the effort and will be blending down additional HEU under the new approach.

-- With respect to the Nuclear Cities Initiative, I wish to announce that just this morning, Minister Rumyantsev and I on behalf of our agencies committed to continue projects under the provision of the NCI government-to-government agreement, including a new partnership we formed with the city Snezhinsk for the development of a Positron Emission Center. This $9 million project will provide state-of-the-art medical imaging capability to diagnose cancer, and will involve many Russian entities, the Bio Medical Research Foundation of Northwest Louisiana, and the Larwrence Livermore National Laboratory. Minister Rumyantsev and I have also tasked our representatives to press ahead in forging a new agreement that meets the concerns of our governments. Our top legal experts will hold their first meeting next week.

And I have one final announcement tonight. In a very short time, the U.S. Department of Energy, in partnership with Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency, will return fresh HEU fuel from a research reactor in Romania to Russia for down-blending and use in reactors. This is a big victory for nonproliferation, and part of an even larger, global campaign to minimize commercial use of HEU.

So far in this effort we've completed a campaign in which 38 research reactors using U.S.-origin HEU in 22 countries have been converted to LEU, keeping over 3,300 kilograms of weapon-usable material off the market.

That's 50 percent of the known reactors with US-origin HEU fuel outside the United States.

We are developing a new low enriched uranium fuel, which can help us replace HEU fuel in additional remaining reactors.

We are on the brink of finalizing a government-to-government agreement with Russia to provide financial assistance to enable Russia to return Russian-origin HEU in research reactors scattered around the world.

In short, substantial progress is being made, on many fronts, and in many areas. Yes, there are legitimate issues, which arise on both sides, but Minister Rumyantsev and I - and our teams - are committed to working through them and keeping the programs on track.

Contrary to the assertions of some, money is not an issue, as our budgets and as the Global Partnership initiative attest. Likewise inaccurate are the assertions of some who claim that one side or the other is providing inadequate commitment to or emphasis on these programs. Indeed, as too often happens in policy debates, it seems that every time we launch a new initiative or meet a milestone on time or early, the response from some critics is to identify a new initiative that allegedly hasn't been pursued sufficiently and bemoan our failure to do so.

When it occurs, I'm reminded of a comment made by President Johnson many years ago. He said that "if one morning I walked on top of the water across the Potomac River, the headline that afternoon would read 'President Can't Swim.'"

Now of course, it goes without saying that it is understandable and appropriate for others to call for greater progress, and we take great pains to look closely at such advice and to implement good ideas.

But our ability to sustain and expand support for these programs in Congress requires not only that the Congress understand that more needs to be done, but also that they believe the money they are spending is being used effectively and efficiently to both meet and exceed the goals to which it is directed.

The help of people like you who understand this and can assist us in accurately communicating that message is vital.

Looking at the Bigger Picture

While progress in the bilateral context is moving along smartly, there is a broader set of issues that merits serious and sustained attention. Nonproliferation efforts over the past fifty years have generally prevented nuclear threats from arising. But there are nonetheless a few states challenging the nonproliferation regime - and even one such state is too many.

In Vienna at the IAEA's General Conference, I proposed three steps to address some potential challenges.

I urged the international community to focus its efforts on further strengthening safeguards, shoring up efforts to control the flow and commerce of dangerous nuclear and dual use materials and commodities, and strengthening security at nuclear reactors and other sites where nuclear or radiological materials may be co-located.

On behalf of the United States, I also announced an extra-budgetary contribution of $3 million to the IAEA, to help jump-start these efforts.

I called upon the international community to also make contributions to the IAEA's nuclear security fund, because these initiatives will not succeed without a broad international commitment. Over 20 states have in fact contributed to the Nuclear Security Fund - a good endorsement of its importance.

These initiatives are key to the sustained success of the nonproliferation regime. But the NPT is being challenged, and we must take strong measures, including those I have outlined, to impede the efforts of those determined to undermine it.

We must deal immediately and effectively with any state seeking to exploit the Treaty to its own advantage by ignoring its treaty obligations.

We have seen what happened when the DPRK took this route. I am confident that progress will be made in dismantling the North Korean weapons program in the context of the six-party talks. But we need to look at why North Korea, while a member of the NPT, was able to make so much progress on its weapons programs in the first place.

North Korea's activities send a message to other would-be proliferants. This worrisome message asserts that a state can be a member of the NPT, enjoy its benefits, and still put in place the assets it needs to break out of the Treaty quickly and pronounce itself a nuclear weapon state. This is the wrong message, and we must learn from this chain of events and not allow it to happen again.

All states that support the nonproliferation regime, and the peaceful benefits that it provides, need to take a clear view of the problem posed by proliferant states that attempt to flout the NPT, and address that problem realistically and with determination.

That is why the step taken last week at the IAEA Board of Governors, when the board adopted by consensus a resolution demanding greater transparency from Iran with respect to its nuclear programs, was so important.

The resolution makes clear that member states are prepared to take firm and necessary action to withstand serious challenges to the nonproliferation regime.

Conclusion

This evening I have raised some fundamental issues, and I am confident that you will give them serious thought.

They speak to the very heart of our future safety and security, and they should be of paramount concern to all of us here this evening.

In closing, let me quote from President Eisenhower who fifty years ago declared, "If a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all; and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all." These words were true fifty years ago and they are still true today.

And to emphasize one thought: the issues I have raised will not be solved by any one nation, or by a few.

Ultimately, it will take a collective commitment from all concerned nations, acting cooperatively and assuredly in the name of advancing the interests that are shared by all responsible nations.

Thank you and good luck in your deliberations.

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